Transubstantiation: A Metaphysical Proposal

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ABSTRACT: This article aims to provide an intelligible explication of the doctrine of Transubstantiation. A new model of this doctrine is formulated within the formal, Neo-Aristotelian metaphysical and ontological framework of E.J. Lowe, termed Serious Essentialism and the Four-Category Ontology. Formulating the doctrine of Transubstantiation within this metaphysical and ontological framework—which we can term the Neo-Aristotelian Account—will enable it to be explicated in a clear and consistent manner, and the oft-raised intelligibility objection and question can be answered.

1. Introduction

According to the doctrine of Transubstantiation, at the moment of the consecration of the “Eucharistic element,”¹ the substance of bread and wine is transformed into Jesus Christ’s body and blood (such that Christ becomes present in a metaphysically robust way). That is, as the Council of Trent states, “a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of His blood.” Hence, post-consecration, the substance of the Eucharistic element—which we can now term the host (Latin: hostia, “sacrificial victim”)—is Jesus Christ, and the substance of bread and the wine is really absent, with this transformation leaving only the appearance (i.e., sensible qualities) of bread and wine on the altar.² Given this, we can construe the central elements of the doctrine of Transubstantiation as follows:

(1) (Transubstantiation) (i) At the moment of consecration, Jesus Christ becomes substantially present in the Eucharistic element through the substance of bread being converted into his body and blood.

(ii) After this conversion, the Eucharistic element continues to have sensible qualities of bread.

A perennial issue that has been raised against the doctrine of Transubstantiation is that of the intelligibility problem, which is expressed clearly by Michael Dummett (1987, 241) when he writes:

The primary philosophical question is...how it is possible to deny propositions that pass all the normal tests for truth, namely that this is bread and wine, and affirm in their place propositions that pass none of these tests.

¹ A term used in reference to the entity that is physically on the paten and in the chalice.
² From now on, the Eucharistic element of the bread—rather than the bread and wine—will be focused on for ease of writing. However, the conclusion reached in this article is also taken to apply to the wine in the same way.
On the basis of this problem, a Roman Catholic (hereafter, Catholic) is presented with an intelligibility question: what, ontologically, does it mean for Jesus Christ to be substantially present within the Eucharistic element and for the element to solely appear to be bread? The central aim of this article is to provide an answer to this question by formulating a model—termed the Neo-Aristotelian Account—that can explain the central affirmations of this doctrine in a clear and intelligible manner. More specifically, this end will be achieved by situating the doctrine of Transubstantiation within a particular metaphysical and ontological framework—namely, the Serious Essentialism and Four-Category Ontology of E.J. Lowe, which will re-construe the transformation of the Eucharistic element as that of an essential (i.e., kind) change. This re-construal will ultimately provide an answer to our intelligibility question and thus establish grounds for one to affirm the intelligibility of this central Christian doctrine, without, however, one assuming some overly weighty metaphysical baggage.

Thus, the plan is as follows: in section two (“A Neo-Aristotelian Ontology”), I explicate a particular metaphysical thesis concerning the nature of essence—termed “Serious Essentialism”—and a specific formal ontological framework—termed “the Four-Category Ontology,” both of which have been introduced by E.J. Lowe in the field of metaphysics. In section three (“A Neo-Aristotelian Transubstantiation”), I then apply the thesis of Serious Essentialism and the Four-Category Ontology to the issue at hand, which will provide an intelligible model of the doctrine of Transubstantiation—and thus also provide an answer to the intelligibility question. In section four (“Objections and Replies”), I respond to four objections against the account. Finally, after this section, there will be a concluding section (“Conclusion”), which will summarise the above results and conclude the article.

2. A Neo-Aristotelian Ontology

2.1 Serious Essentialism

Essentialism is the metaphysical view that holds to a certain range of entities being meaningfully said to have essences and/or essential features. According to E.J. Lowe (2008), essentialism comes in two different forms: Serious Essentialism and Ersatz Essentialism. The ersatz form of essentialism, which is the more prevalent form of essentialism found within contemporary thought, seeks to provide a modal characterisation of the notion of essence—namely, that of an essence being the collection of properties that an entity must possess in order to exist—and has been defended by various “possible world” theorists. In contrast to this, Serious Essentialism seeks to follow Aristotle and, to a greater extent, John Locke, in construing an essence as “the very being of anything,
whereby it is, what it is” (Locke, 1975: III, III, 15, quoted in: (Lowe 2008, 34)). More precisely, we can state the thesis of Serious Essentialism as follows:

\[(2) \text{(Serious Essentialism)} \quad \text{An essence of an entity } x \text{ is what } x \text{ is or what it is to be } x, \text{ as expressed by a real definition.}\]

An essence of an entity is the \textit{whatness} of that entity—it constitutes its \textit{identity}.\footnote{Where the type of identity featured in this case is not that of the relation of identity, which is symbolised by the equals sign “=” , and is the relation that everything necessarily bears to itself and nothing else.} Hence, the thesis of Serious Essentialism seeks to provide a \textit{non-modal} characterisation of the notion of essence through providing a means for one to identify, in the most perspicuous manner, \textit{what} an entity is. Importantly, however, the specific approach to essence provided by Serious Essentialism does not make the further move of \textit{reifying} essences by taking an essence to be a further entity in addition to the entity that possesses it. Rather, entities have essences, but essences are not entities (i.e., an objectively real thing). Thus, as Lowe notes, an entity’s essence “does not literally contain any entities as parts or constituents, since only entities can have other entities as parts” (Lowe 2013, 195). The “parts” that feature in an individual and general essence are parts of the \textit{real definition} that express those essences. Thus, the notion of a real definition plays a central role in the approach to essence proposed by Lowe’s Serious Essentialism. At a more specific level, a real definition, according to Lowe (2012b, 935), is the “definition of a thing (\textit{res}, or entity) in contradistinction to a verbal definition.” That is, a statement of essence is a real definition by it specifying \textit{what it is to be} a particular entity, as Lowe (2012b, 935) further writes:

\[ \text{a real definition of an Entity, } E, \text{ is to be understood as a proposition which tells us, in the most perspicuous fashion, what } E \text{ is, or, more broadly, since we do not want to restrict ourselves solely to the essences of actually existing things, what } E \text{ is or would be.} \]

Real definitions thus serve as explanatory principles and are (usually) formulated through a “<To be___>” construction, such as “<To be X is to be Y>.” To help illustrate this notion, we can formulate real definitions for a number of general entities as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Essence</th>
<th>Real Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>What Gold is or what it is to be Gold</td>
<td>&lt;To be Gold is to be a metal whose atomic constituents have the atomic number 79&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socrates</td>
<td>What Socrates is or what it is to be Socrates</td>
<td>&lt;To be Socrates is to be a rational animal who has Sophroniscus and Phaenarete as his parents&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set</td>
<td>What a set is or what it is to be a set</td>
<td>&lt;To be a set is to be a collection of members that satisfies the axioms of set theory&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[7\text{ Where the type of identity featured in this case is not that of the relation of identity, which is symbolised by the equals sign “=” , and is the relation that everything necessarily bears to itself and nothing else.}\]
At a specific level, the *definiendum*—the entity that appears on the left side of the “<To be___>” construction—is the entity to be defined. And the *definiens*—the entity that appears on the right side of the “<To be___>” construction—performs the function of uniquely identifying and explaining the essential nature of the *definiendum*. A statement that purports to express a real definition, in the sense just explained, is successful if, as Katherine Koslicki (2012, 200) points out, it “not only uniquely identifies and delineates the entity to be defined but also states what it is to be the entity in question, i.e. if it is explanatory of the essential nature of the *definiendum*.” The defining entity thus provides a *distinct way* of referring to the essence of the entity to be defined—with the entity on the right side of the “<To be___>” construction being *definitionally related* to the entity on the left side of the “<To be___>” construction—which results in the *definiens* providing one with further illumination about the *definiendum*. Real definitions are thus explanatory devices that, if successful, express the *identity* of the specific entity and provide *definitive answers* concerning what that entity is. These types of questions, as Sam Cowling (2013, 4) notes, can be termed *what-questions*, which “ask for the metaphysically significant features of an individual and are answered only if they explain that some individual really is.” The essence of an entity and, more importantly, the real definition that is associated with it, thus provide proper answers to what-questions—in other words, a statement concerning the essence of an individual should provide a correct, if partial answer, to questions concerning the identity of a given entity.

Thus, in summary, entities are taken to have essences, which are what it is to be that that entity—in short, it is their identity. These essences are not themselves entities, and are expressed by real definitions, which state what it is to be a given entity in the most perspicuous way possible. From this explication of the thesis of Serious Essentialism, we can now turn our attention to the ontological framework of the Four-Category Ontology.

### 2.2 Four-Category Ontology

Formal ontology focuses on identifying the ontological categories and formal relations that obtain between members of those different categories. A prominent area of formal ontology is that of the *theory of categories*, which seeks to answer the question of *what fundamentally exists*? In recent writings, E.J. Lowe (2006, 2009, 2012a, 2012b) has sought to answer this question by formulating a formal, neo-Aristotelian categorial ontology, termed the *Four-Category Ontology*, which aims to also provide a metaphysical foundation for the natural sciences. We can state the central elements of this ontological framework succinctly as follows:

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8 This ontology is “Neo-Aristotelian” as it finds its roots in Aristotle’s ontological categorisation in his work *Categories*. Furthermore, it is “formal,” due to the fact, as just noted, that this ontology is situated within the branch of analytical metaphysics called formal ontology.
There exists four cross-categorial fundamental ontological categories: objects (substances), modes (property-instances), kinds (substantial universals), and attributes (non-substantial universal).

According to Lowe, the four fundamental categories are defined in terms of three dependence relations: rigid-existential dependence, non-rigid existential dependence, and identity-dependence, and, most importantly, by three formal ontological relations: instantiation, characterisation and exemplification, with the four categories and formal ontological relations being helpfully represented through a diagram, which has been termed by Lowe (2006) and others, the Ontological Square. This diagram can be represented as such:

![Ontological Square](Lowe 2006)

The defining features of the four fundamental categories are thus as follows: firstly, particular (substantial) objects are property-bearing particulars that have determinate existence and identity conditions. They are countable entities and are not themselves borne or possessed by anything else. Furthermore, particular objects are characterised by modes and, more importantly, they are instances of kinds. They are rigidly existentially dependent upon these kinds, where the term “rigid” used here indicates a lack of flexibility in this dependence relation. That is, the existence of an entity (a given $x$) requires the existence of another specific entity (a given $y$) (Tahko and Lowe, 2015). The dependence of $x$ upon $y$, in this form of ontological dependence, is thus a strict implication—namely, $x$’s existence strictly implying $y$’s existence. Thus, within this context, it is necessary that a particular object’s existence is dependent upon the existence of that specific kind.

Secondly, kinds (or substantial universals) are universals that are (secondary) objects and kinds of being. Kinds thus have their membership determined by certain distinctive existence and identity conditions, which can be determined a priori. Additionally, kinds can be construed as forms (in a hylomorphic sense) that constitute the essence or very

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9 With the ontological dependence relations (i.e., dependence profiles) being included within the categories of the Ontological Square.

10 For a further helpful explanation of the conditions of objecthood, see Lowe (1998, Ch.2).

11 Lowe (2006) makes a distinction within this ontology between “first” or “particular” objects and “secondary” objects—identified as kinds—given that both types of entities fulfil the requirements of objecthood (i.e., are property-bearers, have determinate existence and identity conditions, are countable, and are not themselves borne by any other entities).

12 The a priori determination of these conditions distinguishes a kind of being from a natural kind, which would have the conditions for its membership determined a posteriori (Lowe 2006).
identity of a member of that kind (i.e., what it is to be a member of that kind). The particular instances of a given kind are thus (identical to) particular forms, and, more specifically, these instances are particular objects upon which the kind is non-rigidly existentially dependent upon. The term ‘non-rigid’, in contradistinction to rigid existential dependence, is instead used here to express flexibility in this dependence relation, in that the existence of \( x \) does not require the existence of a specific entity, but only an entity that possesses characteristics of a certain class (\( F_x \)). That is, this dependence relation only requires simply that at least some \( F_x \) exist, rather than with the rigid requirement of a specific object existing. Therefore, within this context, it is necessary that a kind’s existence is dependent upon the existence of some instance of that kind. In addition to this, kinds are also characterised by attributes, which they depend upon for their identity. This specific notion of identity-dependence, as noted by Lowe, centres around the fact that “the identity of \( x \) depends on the identity of \( y \)—or, more briefly, that \( x \) depends for its identity upon \( y \)—is to say that which thing of its kind \( y \) is fixes (or metaphysically determines) which thing of its kind \( x \) is” (Lowe 1998, 147, emphasis added). In this context, it is thus of the essence of the kind in question to derive its identity from the specific attributes that characterise it.

Thirdly, attributes (or non-substantial universals/properties) are—like kinds—universals that are to be construed as universal ways of being of a given entity. Specifically, attributes function as characterising property universals. Any given two entities can thus be qualitatively the same whilst being numerically distinct. Attributes have modes as their instances, rather than particular objects, and are non-rigidly existentially dependent upon the category of kinds (which they also characterise). It is thus important to note that this specific ontological framework is a version of immanent realism, according to which there exist no un-instantiated attributes (i.e., universals). Therefore, it is an essential feature of any attribute that it has particular instances which ground its existence.

Fourthly, and finally, modes (or property-instances) are particularised properties that are to be construed as the particular ways of being of a given entity. Specifically, modes function as particular ways in which a given particular object may be a certain thing. Any given two entities can thus be qualitatively similar whilst being numerically distinct. Modes are instances of attributes, upon which they are rigidly existentially dependent, and they serve the role of characterising objects, upon which they are also identity and rigidly existentially dependent.

These four fundamental ontological categories of objects, kinds, attributes, and modes, are related by (and are partly defined in terms of) the asymmetrical formal ontological relations of characterisation, instantiation, and exemplification. These ontological relations, according to Lowe (2006), are irreducible and primitive notions. The implication here is that we cannot provide a reductive analysis or definition of their nature. Yet, we can still draw certain distinctions between them. Firstly, characterisation, which is traditionally termed ‘inherence’, is a relationship that takes the characterising entities (i.e., modes and attributes) not as constituents (or parts of) the entities in which they characterise (i.e., objects and kinds), but as ‘characteristics’, ‘features’ or ‘aspects’ of these entities. For example, a redness-attribute characterises the kind Tomato, and thus the

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13 Lowe (1998 and 2012a) puts forward an original interpretation of the Aristotelian thesis of hylomorphism by taking a form to be a universal (i.e., a substantial universal/kind) and de-ontologises the category of matter. Entities are thus not a combination of matter and form but solely are identified as particularised forms.

14 Modes are similar to “tropes” postulated by Classical Trope Theorists; however, the primary distinction to be drawn between the former and the latter type of entities is that of modes being characteristics that are dependent on their bearers—whereas (module) tropes are parts of their bearers and are possibly “free-floating” entities—more on the nature of tropes below.

15 These asymmetrical formal ontological relations play a role in defining the entities within the four fundamental categories; however, this is only a partial role due to this defining role being shared with the various dependence relations.
colour “redness” is to be taken as a “characteristic,” “feature,” or “aspect” of the kind Tomato. Additionally, a redness-mode, which is an instance of a redness-attribute, characterises a particular tomato, and thus the colour “redness” is a particular “characteristic,” “feature,” or “aspect” of that tomato. Secondly, instantiation is a relationship between a particular entity and a universal. However, the particular entities (i.e., objects and modes) are again not to be taken as constituents of universals (i.e., kinds and attributes), but simply are particular instances of them. That is, a particular tomato is to be taken as an instance of the kind Tomato.

Thirdly, exemplification is a relationship between an object and an attribute. Exemplification, however, is not a primitive formal ontological relation but is instead an indirect relationship between an object and an attribute. It is non-primitive (and non-direct), given that it is a resultant relationship derivable from the two other formal ontological relations of instantiation and characterisation. These formal ontological relations are species of the relationship of exemplification, which provide two fundamentally different ways in which a particular object can be indirectly related to an attribute. That is, either the particular object exemplifies an attribute through instantiating a kind which, in turn, is characterised by the attribute, or the object exemplifies an attribute through being characterised by a mode which, in turn, instantiates the attribute itself. For example, a particular tomato exemplifies a redness-attribute by either instantiating the kind Tomato, which is itself characterised by a redness-attribute or, by being characterised by a redness-mode, which is an instance of the same redness-attribute.

Furthermore, these two distinct species of exemplification, according to Lowe (2009), obtain in two different varieties, modes, or manners, which are termed “dispositional exemplification” and “occurrent exemplification.” However, for Lowe, the distinction between the dispositional and the occurrent does not represent a distinction between two different types of properties. Rather the distinction is between dispositional and occurrent predication, relations, and state of affairs. Thus, the Four-Category Ontology disposes with dispositional and occurrent properties and instead describes things at three levels:

(4) (Dispositional/Occurrent Distinction)

(i) State of Affairs Level: Dispositional & occurrent state of affairs
(ii) Relational Level: Dispositional & occurrent exemplification
(iii) Linguistic Level: Dispositional & occurrent predication.

In light of these three levels, a dispositional state of affairs is one in which a particular object instantiates a kind. This is in turn characterised by an attribute, resulting in the object dispositionally exemplifying that attribute. This then can be expressed linguistically through dispositional predication, which is stated formally by Lowe (2009, 178) as such (with “Dis[a, F]” standing for “a exemplifies attribute F dispositionally” and “/” standing for instantiation):

(5) (Dispositional) \[ \text{Dis[a, F]} = \text{df. } (\exists \Phi)(\Phi F & a/ \Phi) \]

16 The majority of metaphysicians favour the term “categorical” rather than “occurrent” for properties that are not dispositional. However, Lowe sees this term as being metaphysically loaded, and so prefers the latter.
17 Thus, a state of affairs here is simply the indirect “possession” of a property (attribute) by an object.
Whereas an occurrent state of affairs is one in which a particular object is characterised by a mode which, in turn, instantiates an attribute, resulting in the particular object occurrently exemplifying that attribute. This then can also be expressed linguistically through occurrent predication, which is again stated formally by Lowe (2009, 178) as such (with ‘Occ[a, F]’ standing for “a exemplifies attribute F occurrently,” “r” standing for “kind,” and a juxtaposition of the constants or variables (e.g., ‘βG’), representing “characterisation”):

\[
(6) \text{(Occurrent)} \quad \text{Occ}[a, F] =_{dc} (\exists r)(ar & r/F)
\]

Particular objects can thus exemplify a given attribute in either of these two ways: dispositionally or occurrently, which is thus the obtaining of either a dispositional or occurrent state of affairs, that is expressed, linguistically, through dispositional or occurrent predication. For example, a particular tomato dispositionally exemplifies a redness-attribute through it being an instance of the kind Tomato, which is, in turn, characterised by a redness-attribute.\(^{18}\) However, a particular tomato occurrently exemplifies a redness-attribute by it being characterised by a redness-mode which is, in turn, an instance of a redness-attribute.\(^{19}\) We can further illustrate this dispositional/occurrent distinction through another version of the Ontological Square which can be illustrated as follows:

![Ontological Square (Version 2)](Lowe 2009, 117)

Given this, there is thus a distinction between dispositional and occurrent states/relations/predicates that ground the exemplification of an attribute by a particular object.

In summary, within the ontological framework of the Four-Category Ontology, there are thus four fundamental ontological categories: objects, kinds, attributes, and modes. These are defined by three ontological dependence relations: rigid existential dependence, non-rigid existential dependence, and identity-dependence. These are related to other by three fundamental formal ontological relations: instantiation, characterisation, and exemplification. The Four-Category Ontology thus provides a clear ontological framework for assessing the nature and relationships of various types of entities. We can now focus our attention on utilising and applying the thesis of Serious Essentialism and the Four-Category Ontology to the task at hand.

\(^{18}\) In a predicative sense, one would communicate this state of affairs by simply saying that “the tomato is red,” which in the above schema, is: Dis[t, R] where “r” stands for tomato and “R” for the attribute of redness.

\(^{19}\) In a predicative sense, one would communicate this state of affairs by simply saying that “the tomato is redding,” which in the above schema, is: Occ[t, R] where “r” again stands for tomato and “R” for the attribute of redness.
3. A Neo-Aristotelian Eucharist

3.1 Essentialism & Transubstantiation

According to the doctrine of Transubstantiation, after the consecration of the Eucharistic element, Jesus Christ is substantially present in such a manner that the element, which used to be substantially bread, has now been transformed into the body and blood of Christ—with solely the appearance (i.e., sensible qualities) of bread remaining. As it stands, more needs to be said if one is to gain a good understanding of the nature of this substantive presence and the transformative event that has taken place. In attempting to do this, we can utilise the metaphysical thesis of Serious Essentialism within this theological context, which allows us to re-construe the notion of Transubstantiation as follows:

(7) (Transubstantiation)  

(i) At the moment of consecration, Jesus Christ is substantially present in the Eucharistic element by it ceasing to have an essence of bread and beginning to have an essence of a host.  
(ii) After this conversion, the Eucharistic element continues to have sensible qualities of bread.

In this re-construal of the notion of Transubstantiation—which we can term the Neo-Aristotelian Account—we see that the Eucharistic element transforms from being bread to being a host—that is, the body and blood of Jesus Christ—through there being a change to the essence of this particular entity. An essence, as previously noted, is the whatness or identity of an entity. All entities have an essence—without, however, these essences themselves being entities. Thus, the Eucharistic element has an essence, which is what the element is or what it is to be that element. Moreover, as with all other entities, the Eucharistic element would have a real definition that expresses in the most perspicuous manner possible, the essence of the element—that is, it would state precisely the identity of the element. Hence, in regards to the notion of Transubstantiation, what has taken place at the moment of consecration is that of there being a change to the essence of the element, which we can state precisely as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity (Pre-Consecration)</th>
<th>Essence</th>
<th>Real Definition</th>
<th>Entity (Post-Consecration)</th>
<th>Essence</th>
<th>Real Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eucharistic Element</td>
<td>What bread is or what it is to be bread</td>
<td>&lt;To be (Sacramental) bread is to be a food that is made of wheat flour and contains a certain quantity of water&gt;</td>
<td>Eucharistic Element (Post-Consecration)</td>
<td>What the host is or what it is to be the host</td>
<td>&lt;To be the host is to be the body and blood of Jesus Christ&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Transubstantiation: Essential Change
Prior to the act of consecration, the Eucharistic element exists as bread, due to the fact that the essence of the element, as expressed by its real definition, specifies it as bread. However, once the Eucharistic element is consecrated, there is a change to the essence of the element, such that it now exists as a host, due to the fact that the essence of the element, as expressed by its (post-consecration) real definition, now specifies it as a host. There is thus a transformation of the element—from being one type of “substance” (i.e., particular object) to being another type of “substance” (i.e., particular object)—as the identity of the element changes after the act of consecration—in that, it exists as bread, and then, at the moment of consecration, it ceased to be bread by becoming a particular host. Hence, an answer to two “what-questions” asked of the Eucharistic element during Mass—which, in this case, would be: what is the Eucharistic element pre-consecration? And what is the Eucharistic element post-consecration?—would be that, pre-consecration, the element is a particular (piece of) bread, and, post-consecration, the element is a particular host (i.e., the body and blood of Jesus)—in short, it is Jesus. There is thus a transubstantiation (i.e., an “essential change” or “radical metamorphosis”) of the Eucharistic element within this account.

Now, given the Neo-Aristotelian Account, the question now is: do we now have an account that provides us with an answer to our intelligibility question? I believe not, as the current proposal appears to be incomplete. That is, as it stands, even though the Neo-Aristotelian Account provides us with a statement of the kind of transformation that takes place—namely, an essential change—it does not tell us how this essential change takes place and, more importantly, it does not provide us with an explanation for how the sensible qualities (of bread) remain in the element. That is, in a general context, if an entity was to change from being a particular object with a certain essence—such as being a particular human—to being that of a particular object that has a different essence—such as being a particular crocodile— it is plausible that there should also be a change to the sensible qualities of this object—that is, the particular object should now have the sensible qualities of a crocodile and not a human. However, as this is not held to be the case in the context of the Eucharist—as the sensible qualities of bread clearly remain—one must either say that the Transubstantiation of the Eucharistic element is not to be conceived of as an essential change, or one must provide a further metaphysical explanation for how this change can take place and the sensible qualities can also be taken to remain despite this change occurring. Thus, as it stands, the Neo-Aristotelian Account has not aided us in providing an elucidation of the doctrine of Transubstantiation. However, all is not lost, as we can indeed provide a further precisification of the Neo-Aristotelian Account by focusing our attention now on the robust, neo-Aristotelian ontological framework provided by Lowe—namely, that of the Four-Category Ontology.

### 3.2 Four-Category Ontology & Transubstantiation

Within the framework provided by the Four-Category Ontology, we can categorise the Eucharistic element as follows: the element is a particular object (i.e., individual substance) by it, firstly, being a property bearer (i.e., it bears the attribute of being bread or being a host) with determinate existence and identity conditions, and, secondly, through it not being borne or possessed by any other entity. As a particular object, the element

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20 Though the term “transubstantiation” is regularly associated with the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, the current proposal is to be distinguished from him primarily on the basis of the metaphysical framework which is utilised in its formulation—namely, the neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of E.J. Lowe that includes the notion of Serious Essentialism and the Four-Category Ontology—which might (or might not) correspond with certain areas of Thomistic metaphysical thought.
instantiates two kinds (or forms), one we can term Aquinas, which is instantiated pre-
consecration, and one which we can term Host, which is instantiated post-consecration. These kinds (i.e., kinds of being) have their membership determined by certain distinctive existence and identity conditions that are determinable a priori—where the conditions for a candidate being an actual instance of the kind Host would be that of it being wheat bread that was recently made and is unspoiled. And the conditions for a candidate being an actual instance of the kind Host would be that of it being the body and blood of Jesus Christ. Thus, what members of the kinds Bread and Host are—that is, their (kind or general) essence or the very identity of those members—is determined by them instantiating those specific kinds. Thus, the element—through (sequentially) instantiating the kinds Bread and Host—is thus simply taken to be a bread-instance and a host-instance.

Now, as kinds, Bread and Host would, firstly, each be non-rigidly existentially dependent on the existence of, at least, one (particular) bread or host-instance. Conversely, a bread or host instance would itself be rigidly-existentially dependent on the existence of its kinds, in that it only exists if the kind Bread or kind Host exists as well. Secondly, Bread and Host would also each be characterised by attributes—which we can term b-attributes (i.e., bread-attributes) for the kind Bread, and b-attributes for the kind Host (i.e., host-attributes). B-attributes would be the collection of attributes essential for being bread, such as being made of wheat flour and containing water. And, h-attributes would be a collection of attributes essential for being a host, such as being the body and being the blood of Jesus Christ. With these attributes thus each being essential ‘features’, ‘characteristics’ or ‘aspects’ of the kind Bread and the kind Host. That is, in some sense, these attributes would essentially be possessed by, or ‘inhere’ within, the kind Bread and the kind Host. Resulting in every entity within the kind Bread, if they are to be bread (i.e., a bread-instance)—and every entity within the kind Host, if they are to be a host (i.e., a host-instance)—being essentially propertied in the way that their respective kinds are.

Now, for the instantiation of attributes by modes, an important move needs to be made within the present ontological framework in order to provide a basis for the transformation of the Eucharistic element. That is, within this specific theological context, the set of b-attributes, and not the set h-attributes, are necessarily instantiated by some modes—which, for the b-attributes, we can term b-modes (i.e., bread-modes). Focusing our attention now on the nature of these b-modes: as particular instances of the b-attributes, the existence of the b-modes, would be rigidly existentially dependent upon the existence of the b-attributes, in that the b-modes necessarily exist only if the b-attributes exist. Conversely, the existence of the b-attributes would each be non-rigidly existentially dependent on the existence of the b-modes, in that the b-attributes necessarily exist if at least some b-modes exist. The b-modes, as modes, are particular ways of being. Specifically, they are particular ways in which its bearers would be characterised. Thus, the b-modes would be the collection of the particular attributes essential for being a particular piece of bread, for example, being a particular entity that is made of a certain quantity of flour and contains a certain quantity of water. Hence, the b-modes would each exist as entities that characterise their bearers through bestowing upon them a certain character: the character of being a particular piece of bread. More specifically, each of these b-modes exists as essential ‘properties’, ‘features’ or ‘characteristics’ of the element—they directly bestow the character of ‘breadness’ onto the Eucharistic element, resulting in it being characterised as a particular piece of bread—with a certain shape, colour, texture, weight, etc. Moreover, these b-modes would be identity-dependent on the Eucharistic element, in that it is part of

21 These attributes would be attributes required by the Latin Rite. However, Eastern Rite Catholics are permitted to use (leavened) wheat bread, that contains water, yeast and salt.
the essence of a given b-mode to be the mode that it is (i.e., the mode of that specific bearer) in virtue of its relation to the element.

As the b-attributes—and not the h-attributes—have modes as instances, we take it to be the case that the h-attributes are solely related to the Eucharistic element in a dispositional way—rather than an occurrent way. That is, according to the present account, there are solely two states of affairs that obtain pre-consecration: a dispositional state of affairs, in which the Eucharistic element is dispositionally exemplifying the b-attributes, and an occurrent state of affairs, in which the element is occurrently exemplifying the b-attributes. More precisely, the Eucharistic element is exemplifying the b-attributes dispositionally through instantiating the kind Bread, which is characterised by the b-attributes, resulting in the element—at that specific time—being a bread-instance. Furthermore, the Eucharistic element is also exemplifying the b-attributes occurrently through it being characterised by b-modes, which are instances of the b-attributes, resulting in the element—at that specific time—being characterised as a particular piece of bread. Importantly, however, prior to the act of consecration, the Eucharistic element is not instantiating the kind Host, and neither is it being characterised by h-modes that are instances of the h-attributes, and thus it is not (dispositionally or occurrently) the host prior to the consecration—in short, the Eucharistic element, at this specific time, is not a particular host, but is simply a particular piece of bread. Thus, as noted before, if one were to point to the element on the altar, in its pre-consecration state, during Mass and ask a “what-question”—such as “what is the Eucharistic element?”—the correct answer, as noted previously, would be that the Eucharistic element is a particular piece of bread. We can capture this state of affairs within the Ontological Square, where, in the pre-consecration case, we see that the Eucharistic element exemplifies the h-attributes in the dispositional and occurrent way, and thus is a particular piece of bread, and is not a particular host:

![Ontological Square](image)

Figure 3. Ontological Square (Pre-Consecration Exemplification)

Now, at the moment of consecration, we see a change take place (i.e., a transformation) in two ways: first, there is now a new dispositional state of affairs that obtains—where the Eucharistic element now dispositionally exemplifies the h-attributes—and thus now becomes a host-instance—by the element now instantiating the kind Host, that is, in turn, characterised by the h-attributes. And, second, there is now also a dispositional state of affairs that fails to obtain—which is that of the Eucharistic element failing to dispositionally exemplify the b-attributes. That is, the Eucharistic element is now, post-consecration, dispositionally a host, and has now ceased to dispositionally be bread—it is now solely a host-instance and not a bread-instance. Stated succinctly, post-consecration, the following is true (where e stands for the Eucharistic element, B for b-attributes and H for h-attributes):

(8) (Dispositional*)    (i) ~Dis[e, D]; ~e exemplifies B dispositionally
Importantly, however, the element is still being characterized by b-modes that are instances of the b-attributes, and thus is occurrently bread—that is, it is characterised as bread—which accounts for its sensible qualities. In other words, post-consecration, the qualities of the bread, in the “propertied” form of the b-attributes, are taken to be features of the particular element (i.e., the consecrated host), through the element being characterised by b-modes that are instances of the b-attributes. Stated succinctly, the following is true post-consecration (where \( e \) continues to stand for the Eucharistic element and \( B \) for b-attributes):

\[ (9) \quad \text{Occurrence*} \]

\[ (i) \quad \text{Occ} [e, B]: e \text{ exemplifies } B \text{ occurrently} \]

These modes, being ways in which the element is provided with its character (i.e., that of being characterised as a particular (piece of) bread), are thus characteristics, features or aspects of it. The Eucharistic element is not characterised by h-modes, and thus it is not (occasionally) the host, even though it is dispositionally. Importantly, however, it is indeed the dispositional exemplification of the b-attributes which renders the element as the particular object that it is. That is, post-consecration, the Eucharistic element is a particular host—and is not a particular piece of bread—through it solely being a host-instance. Thus, even though the existence of the b-modes provide the particular element with its character—and thus it appearing to be bread due to this character—it is not a particular piece of bread because it fails to fall into the kind Bread, which would provide its existence and identity conditions. Thus, again, if one were now to point to the element on the altar, in its post-consecration state, and ask a “what-question”—such as “what is the Eucharistic element now?”—the correct answer, as noted previously, would be that it is a host—the body and blood of Jesus Christ (i.e., a host-instance). Thus, despite it appearing to our senses as bread, what it is—that is, what its (kind) essence (or identity) is—is Jesus Christ—though what it is characterised as is a particular piece of bread. Thus, in the post-consecration case, capturing this state of affairs within the Ontological Square again, we have a split exemplification, where the element solely instantiates the kind Host, and thus dispositionally exemplifies the h-attributes, which establishes a dispositional route for the element to exemplify the h-attributes post-consecration:

Figure 4. Ontological Square (Post-Consecration Exemplification (A))

Whilst at the same time, the element is solely characterised by some b-modes, which are instances of the b-attributes, and which thus establishes an occurrent route for the element to exemplify the b-attributes post-consecration:
On the basis of this, we now have a clear metaphysical explanation for how the transformation of the Eucharistic element can take place and the sensible qualities can also be taken to still remain, which has been done by building on the re-construal of the doctrine of Transubstantiation provided by the thesis of Serious Essentialism by utilising the Four-Category Ontology’s four fundamental categories, the formal ontological relationship of exemplification and the dispositional/occurrence distinction. The doctrine of the Transubstantiation is, first, defined in terms of the manner in which the b-attributes and the h-attributes are dispositionally/occurrently exemplified by the Eucharistic element, and, second, it is defined in relation to a change in the essence, or, more specifically, a change to the (substantial) kinds instantiated by the Eucharistic element. Taking all of these things into account, we can now provide a final re-construal of the notion of Transubstantiation as follows:

(10) (Transubstantiation.)

(i) At the moment of consecration, Jesus Christ is substantially present in the “propertied form” of the h-attributes, within the Eucharistic element, through this individual substance ceasing to dispositionally exemplify the b-attributes (and thus it ceasing to have an essence of bread and be a bread-instance) and beginning to dispositionally exemplify the h-attributes (and thus it beginning to have an essence of a host by becoming a host-instance).

(ii) After this conversion, the Eucharistic element continues to have sensible qualities of bread as this conversion does not result in a cessation of the occurrence exemplification of the b-attributes by it, which provide it with its character (i.e., its sensible qualities).

Considering this, we thus have a means of answering our intelligibility question noted above as follows: ontologically, Jesus Christ is substantially in the Eucharistic element, in the form of properties, termed the h-attributes. Prior to the act of consecration, the Eucharistic element has, first, the essence of bread, given the fact that the b-attributes are dispositionally and occurrently exemplified by the element—where they are dispositionally exemplified through the element being an instance of the kind Bread that is characterised by these b-attributes, and they are occurrently exemplified by the b-attributes being instantiated by b-modes, which, in turn, characterise the element as bread. There is, thus,
pre-consecration, the obtaining of dispositional and occurrent state of affairs, in which the element is bread. Importantly, however, the Eucharistic element does not have the essence (or character) of a host at the specific time as it does not (dispositionally or occurrently) exemplify the h-attributes. That is, pre-consecration, there is no obtaining dispositional or occurrent state of affairs, in which the element is a particular host. However, after the act of consecration, this individual substance (i.e., the Eucharistic element) changes in its essence by it ceasing to instantiate the kind Bread—resulting in these b-attributes no longer being dispositionally exemplified by the element. Hence, the Eucharistic element ceases to possess the essence of bread and thus be a particular (piece of) bread, and now comes to possess the essence of a particular host by it becoming a host-instance (i.e., an instance of the kind Host), which results in the h-attributes being dispositionally exemplified by it. There is thus an obtaining of a dispositional state of affairs, post-consecration, in which the particular element is Jesus Christ. Yet, the element continues to occurrently exemplify the b-attributes, by being characterised by b-modes, which instantiate these attributes and thus provide the Eucharistic element with its character. In summary, in the re-construal of the notion of Transubstantiation that is provided by the Neo-Aristotelian Account, the Eucharistic element ceases, at the moment after consecration, to have the essence of bread (i.e., fails to dispositionally exemplify the b-attributes as a bread-instance)—expressed by a certain real definition—and thus be bread. And it now comes to possess the essence of a host (i.e., it now dispositionally exemplifies the h-attributes by being a host-instance)—expressed by another real definition—and, thus, it is now correctly identified as a particular host. Yet, despite this essential change (i.e., kind-change), the Eucharistic element continues to be charactered as bread—as there is an occurrent state of affairs, post-consecration, where the Eucharistic element is characterised by b-modes, which provides it with its sensible qualities. The central components of the thesis of Serious Essentialism and the Four-Category Ontology thus allow a clear and consistent explication of the doctrine of Transubstantiation and thus underwrites a plausible answer to the intelligibility question that was previously raised against this notion. I will now consider four objections.

4. Objections and Responses

4.1 The Persistence Objection

Objection: According to the Neo-Aristotelian Account, Transubstantiation is to be conceived of as one and the same entity changing from having a certain essence (i.e., being bread) and instantiating a particular kind (i.e., Bread) to having a different essence (i.e., being a host) and instantiating another particular kind (i.e., Host). However, one can ask the question of what the nature of the Eucharistic element is? That is, what specifically is undergoing the change here? (i.e., what persists through the change?). Plausibly, something substantial with an internal identity must persist in the shift from bread-to-host; however, it seems as if there is not anything under the present account that does so persist. Now, against this, one could say that the persisting entities are the particles that compose the bread. However, why this response is a non-starter is because if those entities are taken to persist, then this account will fail to be consistent with traditional Catholic teaching. Thus, one must provide an explanation concerning what entity persists through the transformation that takes place at the moment of consecration, or one will have good reason to doubt the helpfulness of this account in providing a precisification of the doctrine of Transubstantiation.

Response: For the Persistence Objection, we have two possible candidates for the persisting entity: a propertied particular and a property-less particular. For the former, we
can take it to be the case that it is a propertied particular—namely, the individual substance itself—that endures through the change. That is, even though an individual substance is required to instantiate some substantial kind within the Four-Category Ontology, we might, however, think that it is possible in some cases for that substantial kind to change without the individual substance going out of existence. Thus, the individual substance (in our case, the Eucharistic element) persists through the change. However, taking the individual substance to persist through this change does not require it to be “bare”—that is, “property-less”—at any point, as we can take this kind change to occur instantaneously (i.e., at an instant during the utterance of the words of consecration). And thus, there is no time in which the individual substance is property-less (i.e., does not instantiate a substantial kind universal). Second, if one has an issue with the first option just detailed, one can diverge from Lowe and accept the existence of a property-less particular, or, more specifically, a “thin particular,” which would thus endure through the change. Substratum theory, as noted by Ted Sider (2006), conceives of particulars as being, in some sense, separate from their universals (or modes), which thus allows one can make a distinction between a thin particular and a thick particular. The thin particular, as David Armstrong (1983, 95) writes, “is a (substratum), taken apart from its properties. It is linked to its properties by instantiation, but it is not identical to them. It is not bare because to be bare it would have to be not instantiating any properties. But though clothed, it is thin.”

The thin particular is not bare, in the sense of existing “un-clothed”—that is, without instantiating some universals (or modes)—rather, it is bare in the sense of it underlying these universals (or modes), and thus, in this sense, it is property-less. A thin particular is thus what is left over when one subtracts away its universals (or modes). In other words, it is the particular considered in abstraction from all its properties. Whereas the thick particular is the fusion of the particular and its universals—the properties are “contained” within it (Sider, 2006). Hence, in one sense, a particular is a property-less entity—that is the thin particular—whilst, in another sense, it enfolds the properties within itself—that is the thick particular (Armstrong, 1983). Thus, given this distinction, we can take the Eucharistic element to be the thin particular, and we can take the bread, which exists pre-consecration, and the host, which exists post-consecration, to each be thick particulars. The Eucharistic element is thus taken to be an underlying entity that is linked to the properties of “breadness” and “hostness” and is, therefore, the entity that is left over when one subtracts the “breadness” or “hostness” from it—in short, it is the particular that is considered in abstraction from these properties. The Eucharistic element, as a thin particular, can thus persevere through the transformation that occurs at the moment of consecration, with the entity that does not survive this change solely being that of the bread (i.e., there is a change in thick particulars—bread to host). That is, we can identify the substantial something that was needed as the thin particular termed the Eucharist element, which is conceived of as being an underlying, property-less (“thin”) entity that can persist through the shift from bread-to-host that takes place at the moment of consecration. Thus, given these two possible options, the Persistence Objection is not applicable to the Neo-Aristotelian Account that has been proposed here.

4.2 The Absence Objection

Objection: According to the doctrine of Transubstantiation, the bread is completely absent from the element post-consecration; however, there remains on the altar the appearance (i.e., sensible qualities) of bread. That is, the consecrated host, even if it is no longer substantially bread, still appears in every sense to be so and does not appear to be the bodily flesh or

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22 Lowe (1998) raises issues against the notion of a bare particular.
blood of Jesus. However, given the conceptualisation of the doctrine of Transubstantiation provided by the account proposed here, one can raise a question concerning the presence of the sensible qualities of bread. More specifically, according to the Neo-Aristotelian Account detailed above, the sensible qualities are conceived of as modes that characterise the Eucharistic element (i.e., the b-modes) and thus provide it with the character of—what I have termed—“breadness” (e.g., the particular type of flour that it is made of and the specific quantity of water that it contains, which results in it having a certain shape, colour, texture, weight, etc.). The sensible qualities of the bread remain through the occurrent exemplification of the b-attributes by the element. However, if we construe the sensible qualities in this manner, then doesn’t the presence of modes within the element result in the presence of not only the sensible qualities of bread, but also of actual bread itself? As one can ask what there is to a particular (piece of) bread, but its modes—that is, its particular “features,” “characteristics,” or “aspects” of being made of flour and containing water (which results in it having a certain shape, colour, texture weight, etc.). There thus appears to be no real absence of the bread in this model, which is a clear implication of the teaching provided by the doctrine of Transubstantiation. Instead, it seems to be the case that the bread continues to exist in the form of the b-modes, which provides the breadness character of a particular Eucharistic element. This all results in there not being any conversion or Transubstantiation of the element from bread to Jesus—rather, pre-consecration, the element is bread, and post-concentration, the element remains as bread.

Response: The Absence Objection raised here is not a problem for the Neo-Aristotelian Account, once a further specification of the nature of the particular properties posited here is made. This distinction does not feature in the formal ontological framework explicated above; however, it is nevertheless compatible with it and has played a part in the wider philosophical discourse concerning the nature of particular properties, that is, “tropes.” This distinction was discovered by Michael Loux (2015) and elucidated more fully by Robert K. Garcia (2015a, 2015b). This specific distinction centres around the conceptualisation of tropes as either modifier tropes or module tropes, concisely construed in the following way:

(11) (Tropes) (MO) A modifier trope is a singly, maximally-thin property that does not have the character that it grounds.

(MD) A module trope is a singly, maximally-thin object that possesses the character that it grounds.

At a general level, modifier tropes and module tropes are both taken to be non-shareable, maximally-thin (i.e., singly characterized), character-grounders (Garcia 2015a)—with the central difference between these two types of tropes being that of the latter being an object that exemplifies the character that it grounds, and the former being a property that does not exemplify this character, but simply bestows it upon, that is “makes,” something else to be characterized in that specific way. That is, more fully, modifier tropes are properties that are not in any way characterized. Rather, modifier tropes are character-makers in the sense that they make something else (i.e., the particular object that bears the trope) characterized, but are not themselves characterized in that specific way. A modifier trope’s character-making ability is thus asymmetric, which results in the case that when a modifier trope characterises a numerically distinct entity, then the character that is bestowed upon it is solely located at the object-level, and is thus absent at the trope-level (Garcia 2015a). Thus, for example, a particular object is spherical in virtue of its modifier trope, which “spherizes” that object, by simply making it spherical, without it sharing in that character as well. The character grounding provided by a modifier trope is thus de novo (or sui generis) (Garcia 2015a).
However, the character grounding provided by a modifier trope is to be held in distinction from a module trope, as a module trope grounds the character of something else (i.e., a particular object) through itself being characterized in that specific way as well. Collectively, module tropes ground the character of an object by the object being reducible to a “bundle” of compresent module tropes that possess this character. For module tropes, there is thus a reproduction of trope-level character at the object-level, and vice versa (Garcia 2015a). Thus, for example, a particular object is spherical and red in virtue of its module tropes, which are themselves spherical and red, and together (compresently) are parts (or constituents) of that object. A module tropes’ character grounding, rather than being de novo, can thus be taken to be some type of parthood (or constitution) relation (Garcia 2015a).

Taking this particular properties distinction into account, we can take the Absence Objection to have mistakenly assumed an (MD) view of b-modes, which would take them to be maximally thinly characterized objects, that constitute, or are a part of, the Eucharistic element. Now, if this was the view of the properties that was assumed by the account above, then there would indeed be an entailment of the element being a particular (piece of) bread by it possessing a collection of b-modes. This is due to the element, within this viewpoint, needing to be re-construed as a “bundle” of compresent module tropes that would constitute the element as it is, namely as bread. The element would be reducible to its tropes and thus would be bread because it is constituted by a set of module tropes that ground this character. Thus, if these types of modes are present, then the objection holds, and there is no real, substantial absence of the bread post-consecration. However, it is plausible to take the type of particular properties that are postulated by this account—which we have initially construed as modes—to, in fact, be modifier tropes, rather than module tropes. This is due to a mode within the Four-Category Ontology being explicitly taken to be a property (i.e., a modification or particular way) and not an object (i.e., a characterized property bearer). Thus it would be a category mistake within the ontology to allow a module trope to be a mode and to act like one—through fulfilling the role of characterising other objects. Specifically, because objects within this ontology do not ground character, but are characterized, and thus a module trope, as a characterized character grounder could not be a mode. In addition to this, modes are taken within this ontology to be characteristics rather than constituents (or parts) of the object that they characterize, and thus an object is not reducible to a “bundle” of compresent tropes, but simply is the fundamental subject of its inhering modes. Thus, taking the type of modes here to be construed as (MO), the b-modes that bestow the character of “breadness” on the element, and thus provide the element with its specific sensible qualities (e.g., the particular type of flour that it is made of and the specific quantity of water that it contains, which results in it having a certain shape, colour, texture, weight, etc.), are simply maximally-thin properties that act as character-makers, and thus characterise the element, without themselves being characterized in that way. There is no reflexive characterisation of the b-modes, which will fuel the charge that the presence of the collection of b-modes in the element is equivalent to the presence of bread itself. The modes characterise the element, but do not have this character in any way. The Eucharistic element can thus be characterized as bread, through its modifier b-modes, without entailing the presence of bread within the element. Thus, given the conceptualisation of a b-mode as a modifier (trope), the Absence Objection does not hold against the Neo-Aristotelian Account sketched above.

4.3 The Presence Objection

Objection: The Neo-Aristotelian Account proposed here takes the conversion (or transformation) of the Eucharistic element into the body and blood of Jesus Christ to
simply be that of a ceasing of a dispositional exemplification of the b-attributes, by the Eucharistic element, and the initiation of a dispositional exemplification of the h-attributes by it. A particular Eucharistic element is thus only dispositionally Jesus Christ. One could ask, however, if a construal of the “real presence of Christ” in the Eucharist in this specific way—that is, a dispositional way—renders the presence of Christ as a mere potentiality, rather than an actuality. That is, the Eucharistic element seems to purely be disposed to be, that is, it potentially is, the body and blood of Jesus, but, in actuality, it is not. Rather the occurrence state of the element, post-consecration is that of it being bread. There is thus no real presence of Christ within the Eucharist post-consecration within this account, which invalidates the account as an account of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

Response: A potential way in which this objection can be dealt with is through firstly re-emphasising the fact that dispositionality, within the Four-Category Ontology, is not equivalent to potentiality, but rather is a shorthand for the state of affairs (expressed by a certain type of predication) of a particular object (i.e., individual substance) instantiating some kind which is characterised by certain attributes. There is thus a terminological mix-up due to dispositionality in this case revolving around a way in which an individual substance can be related ontologically to an attribute, and this way (rather than the occurrence way) provides the identity conditions for that specific substance. Taking this into account, the Eucharistic element has the disposition to be the body and blood of Jesus, not in the sense that it is potentially the body and blood of Jesus, but, instead, just that it, in fact, instantiates the kind Host, which is essentially characterised by the attributes, which are essential for being Jesus Christ—namely, the h-attributes. A particular Eucharistic element is substantially Jesus Christ due to it being an instance of a kind that is essentially characterised as such. Furthermore, this essential characterisation of the kind Host also does not ground any type of potentiality for its instances to exemplify the b-attribute. Rather, by taking into account the notion of intrinsic activity, highlighted by Travis Dumsday (2013, 2016), which is a further feature of the Four-Category Ontology, we can take this exemplification to be an actual (dispositional) state of affairs. More fully, the Four-Category Ontology takes it to be the case that when a kind is characterised by certain attributes, these attributes are activities that the kind is (a-temporally) engaged in (Dumsday 2013). A kind that is characterised by certain attributes is thus intrinsically active, in the sense that it is actively, rather than inactively, characterized in the way of its attributes. Thus, as Dumsday notes: “cow” qua kind is ipso facto something that moos, eats, has deep thoughts, etc.” (Dumsday 2016, 85). These types of activities are attributable to this specific kind. That is, this kind is actively engaged in this activity. Kinds are thus not inert (secondary) objects, but intrinsically (or inherently) active. And as a (particular or first) object is simply an instantiation of its kind, an object would presumably be intrinsically active in the same way as well (Dumsday, 2016). That is, in virtue of instantiating a kind, an object will also inherit its kind’s intrinsic activities. Objects thus instantiate inherently active kinds and are inherently (intrinsically) active because of this. Therefore, taking this into account, we can say that the kind Host is intrinsically active as “Jesus.” That is, the attributes of being the body and being the blood of Jesus Christ, attributed to this kind, are activities that the kind is intrinsically engaged in, in the here and now. The Eucharistic element, being an instance of the kind Host, post-consecration, inherits these intrinsic activities and is thus actively being Christ’s body and blood. These attributes, however, as activities, are not potentialities that do not exist in reality, but instead is an actual active state that the kind Host, and a particular host-instance, is inherently engaged in, in the here and now.

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23 The notion of an activity here is being used in a “stretched” sense, due to the activity being engaged in a-temporally, rather than temporally, as would be the case with the normal usage of the word.
Thus, again, what the element is post-consecration, that is, its (kind) essence and identity, is that of being Jesus (i.e., a host).

Thus, in sum, to deal with this objection, we firstly re-emphasise the nature of dispositionality within the Four-Category Ontology, which centres around the instantiation of a kind that is characterised by the attribute under question. Secondly, however, we highlight the fact that this dispositional state is not a mere potentiality but is instead an actualised state of affairs—that is, an activity in which the element is engaged in. More precisely, the kind Host is engaged in the intrinsic activity of being “Jesus Christ” (i.e., his body and blood), and, as an instance of this kind, the Eucharistic element inherits this activity, and thus it can be taken to also be actively, though dispositionally, “Jesus Christ” as well.\textsuperscript{24} The Presence objection thus does not affect the Neo-Aristotelian account as well.

4.4 The Property Objection

Object{ion:} The Neo-Aristotelian Account proposed here takes Jesus—that is, his body and blood—to be present in a propertied form (i.e., the \textit{collection of properties} of his body and blood are present in the Eucharist). However, in the doctrine of the Real Presence captured by the notion of Transubstantiation, it is Jesus Christ \textit{himself} that is taken to be really present in the Eucharist. Thus, Catholics and various individuals who feel compelled to take Jesus’s words at the Last Supper literally (i.e., that he is literally in the element) seemingly will feel compelled to reject this account in a similar way in which they reject non-realist accounts of the Eucharist. This account does not posit the \textit{literal} presence of Jesus in the Eucharistic element, but only that of the presence of a collection of properties within it. We do not have an account here that fits with the biblical narrative and the position of Catholics who adhere to the real, and thus literal, presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

Response: This objection is helpful in highlighting the relation between one’s view of the Eucharist and that of the Incarnation—where a position taken on one of these theological doctrines can determine the position taken on the nature of the other. Now, read within the context of the Incarnation, the objection seems to assume a \textit{concretist} view of the human (and divine nature) of Jesus (i.e., a concrete, particular, part-whole nature), rather than an abstractivist view (i.e., an abstract collection of attributes that are necessary and sufficient for being human (and divine)).\textsuperscript{25} For the abstractivist view, the hypostatic union is thus a union of two abstract natures within Christ, who is himself a particular concrete individual. Whilst a concretist view, on the other hand, takes Christ, in the hypostatic union, to be some type of composite whole, with God the Son, Christ’s human body and soul being, in some sense, proper parts of Christ.\textsuperscript{26} Now, if one takes the latter view, which is that of Christ possessing a concrete (divine and human) nature, then yes, the solution provided by the Neo-Aristotelian Account does not work. As Christ’s presence within the Eucharistic element would need to be in the form of a concrete presence (i.e., his concrete, part-whole nature being present within the element), and the account in question does not posit that. However, if one takes the former view, the

\textsuperscript{24} For one to say that the Eucharistic element is actively “breadness,” that is actively appearing as bread, is not also to say that it is \textit{dispositionally} bread, as the latter type of predication—within the proposed account and ontology—is simply that of the element being characterised by the b-modes, which is an instance of the attributes.

\textsuperscript{25} Specifically, the concretist and abstractivist view of the Incarnation concerns the nature of the human nature that was assumed by Christ and not his essential divine nature. However, these terms can plausibly be extended to the divine nature as well.

\textsuperscript{26} This interpretation of the concretist view is that of Brian Leftow’s (2002) and Oliver Crisp’s (2011). However, there are other forms of the concretist view that do not assume a mereological view of Christ’s nature. For these types of views, see Flint (2011). For a defence of the abstractivist view, see Swinburne (1994 and 2011).
abstractist view, then the objection does not apply—as Christ’s presence within the
Eucharistic element takes the form of an abstract presence (i.e., his abstract, propertied
nature being present within the element). Thus, Christ being literally present in the
Eucharistic element is that of his necessary and sufficient human and divine properties
being present within it (i.e., the exemplification of the h-attributes by the element). Thus,
Jesus’s sayings at the Last Supper do, in fact, refer to a collection of properties. However,
in the same manner that the conceptual framework was plausibly not in place within a first-
century Jewish setting for Jesus’s followers to understand the nature of the hypostatic
union, the conceptual framework was also not in place for one to understand the (abstract)
nature of the Eucharist. Jesus thus stated at the Last Supper something that was “coarse-
grained” but accessible for his audience. Thus, ultimately, for this objection to stick, one
needs to put forward an independent argument in favour of the concretist view of the
Incarnation. However, until that time presents itself, we are free to push forward with this
account of the doctrine of Transubstantiation, underwritten by the abstractist view of the
Incarnation.

5. Conclusion

In this article, I focused on providing a clear model of the doctrine of Transubstantiation
and answering the oft-raised intelligibility objection against this doctrine. I proceeded to
do this by situating the doctrine within the robust, neo-Aristotelian metaphysical and
ontological framework provided by E.J. Lowe. Doing this allowed an explication of the
discrete change in light of the central aspects of this framework, which was that of the notions of
essential change (i.e., kind-change), and, more importantly, the exemplification relation and
dispositional/occurrent distinction. After unpacking this account, four objections against
it were raised and were shown to be unproblematic, once a further specification of certain
philosophical notions was made. This all allows an intelligible model of the doctrine of
Transubstantiation to be ready for launch in the market.

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