Journal of Analytic Theology <h1 class="entry-title" style="font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</h1> <p>The Journal of Analytic Theology is an open access, international journal that publishes articles, book reviews, and book symposia that explore theological and meta-theological topics in a manner that prizes terminological clarity and argumentative rigor. This includes historical studies that seek to elucidate conceptual challenges or explore strategies for addressing them.</p> The Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame en-US Journal of Analytic Theology 2330-2380 H.E. Baber. <i>The Trinity: A Philosophical Investigation</i> Scott Hill Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 700 702 10.12978/jat.2021-9.180219070811 Marc Cortez, Joshua R. Farris, and S. Mark Hamilton, eds. <i>Being Saved: Explorations in Human Salvation</i> Stephanie Nicole Nordby Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 703 708 10.12978/jat.2021-9.181904131424 Khaled Anatolios. <i>Deification Through the Cross: An Eastern Christian Theology of Salvation</i> Derek King Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 709 714 10.12978/jat.2021-9.030410100806 Oliver D. Crisp, James M. Arcadi, and Jordan Wessling, eds. <i>Love, Divine and Human: Contemporary Essays in Systematic and Philosophical Theology</i> Ross Parker Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 715 720 10.12978/jat.2021-9.171418150017 Jordan Wessling. <i>Love Divine: A Systematic Account of God’s Love for Humanity</i> Gregory A. Boyd Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 721 724 10.12978/jat.2021-9.0617-65011403 Joshua Cockayne. <i>Contemporary With Christ: Kierkegaard and Second-Personal Spirituality</i> Adam Green Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 725 730 10.12978/jat.2021-9.000312061713 Timothy Pawl. <i>In Defense of Extended Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay</i> Thomas Schärtl Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 731 742 10.12978/jat.2021-9.190718180211 Eleanore Stump. <i>Atonement</i> Junius Johnson Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 743 748 10.12978/jat.2021-9.092018091413 Nathaniel Gray Sutanto. <i>God and Knowledge: Herman Bavinck’s Theological Epistemology</i> Gijsbert van den Brink Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 749 753 10.12978/jat.2021-9.0608-65210010 Oliver D. Crisp, James M. Arcadi, and Jordan Wessling. <i>The Nature and Promise of Analytic Theology</i> Jonathan Curtis Rutledge Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 754 758 10.12978/jat.2021-9.0914-65172004 God’s Place in Logical Space <p class="JAT-Abstract" style="text-indent: 0in;">It has been argued recently that classical theism and Lewisian modal realism are incompatible theses. The most substantial argument to this effect takes the form of a trilemma. It argues that no sense can be made of God’s being a necessary being in the modal realistic picture, on pain of, among other things, modal collapse. The question of this essay is: Is that so? My goal here is to detail the reasons that have been offered in support of this contention and then defend the coherence of theistic modal realism from the trilemma. I call my reply to the argument an “Anselmian-Thomistic” defense, since it appeals to resources from classical medieval philosophy, especially from Anselm and Aquinas.</p> Andrew Dennis Bassford Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 100 125 10.12978/jat.2021-9.001318010003 Repairing the Contingency Argument against Divine Simplicity <p>According to classical theism, God is simple. However, contemporary objections to divine simplicity abound. One of those objections has received a lot of attention recently: the contingency objection. The objection is taken to pose a threat to God's freedom. Tomaszewski argues that the argument that supports the contingency objection, however, is invalid. Herein, I supply two valid versions of the argument; thus, the classical theist is required to defuse the argument.</p> Matthew James Collier Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 126 136 10.12978/jat.2021-9.120009021417 Taming Zootheism: On Equality, Fairness, and Incarnation <p>Blake Hereth has recently argued for <em>zootheism</em>, the view that God has incarnated as a non-human animal. I argue that zootheism is compatible with orthodox Christianity, and that at least one argument for it has some force. But I also argue that Hereth’s <em>version</em> of zootheism conflicts with orthodox Christianity, as do some of the arguments Hereth uses to motivate it. And then I argue that the elements of Hereth’s view which conflict with orthodox Christianity are independently implausible anyway: the conflicting details are better filled in in other ways, and the conflicting arguments fail. Recognizing this yields a version of zootheism which is in harmony with orthodox Christianity while still having a philosophical motivation.</p> Dustin Crummett Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 137 157 10.12978/jat.2021-9.032013021719 Compassionate Exclusivism: Relational Atonement and Post-Mortem Salvation <p>Faithful persons tend to relate to their religious beliefs as truth claims, particularly inasmuch as their beliefs have soteriological implications for those of different religions. For Christians the particular claims which matter most in this regard are those made by Jesus of Nazareth and his claims are primarily relational in nature. I propose a model in which we understand divine grace from Jesus as being mediated through relational knowledge of him on a compassionately exclusivist basis, including post-mortem. Supporting this model, I draw from Eleonore Stump’s hypothesis in her 2018 <em>Atonement</em> that the crucifixion of Jesus opens the divine psyche to all human psyches sufficiently for salvific mutual indwelling to occur, and from Gavin D’Costa’s conception of the <em>descensus Christi ad inferos</em> as the mechanism for grace’s accessibility post-mortem presented in his 2009 <em>Christianity and World Religions</em>. This model seeks to address ongoing, justified pastoral concern for the soteriological status of non-Christians while still treating Christianity as objectively true.</p> Aaron Brian Davis Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 158 179 10.12978/jat.2021-9.000013030018 Theology without Anathemas <p>The object of the present essay is to establish the possibility of “theology without anathemas.” First, an argument is given for the conclusion that infallible knowledge in matters of theology is not now possible. Both the Protestant doctrine of <em>claritas scripturae</em> and the Roman Catholic understanding of the Magisterium of the Church are rejected. Then, an alternative, “fallibilist” ecclesiology is proposed, according to which (knowingly) to belong to the Church is a matter of (understanding oneself as) having been claimed by Christ as His own. When combined with a universal doctrine of election and a highly objective and actualized doctrine of the Atonement, such a conception of the Church makes it possible to understand theology as a collaborative and cooperative effort on the part of all to understand better this Christ to whom they all always already belong.</p> Steven Nemes Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 180 200 10.12978/jat.2021-9.181913130418 Detachment Issues: A Dilemma for Beall’s Contradictory Christology <p>Jc Beall offers a novel resolution to worries about Christ’s contradictory nature by introducing an account of logical consequence that allows for true contradictions. However, to prevent his view from exploding into heresy, Beall must deny that conditionals detach. But without detachment, the language fails to capture other true entailments which must be included in a complete account of Christ. Beall faces a dilemma, then, between heresy and inadequacy.</p> Meghan D. Page Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 201 204 10.12978/jat.2021-9.120413150004 Separating the Theological Sheep from the Philosophical Goats <p>Andrew Torrance has recently argued that we can distinguish analytic theology from analytic philosophy of religion if we understand theology as, fundamentally, a scientific enterprise. However, this distinction holds only if philosophy of religion is not itself a science in the sense intended by Torrance. I argue that philosophy of religion is a science in this sense, and so, that Torrance cannot distinguish theology from philosophy of religion in the way suggested. Nevertheless, I offer two alternative routes to the distinction based on the nature of the respective objects of study in theology and philosophy of religion. Thus, I demonstrate that there is a coherent model available to Torrance which preserves the distinction he seeks.</p> Jonathan Curtis Rutledge Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 205 222 10.12978/jat.2021-1.3540-39434630 Consummation Anyway: A Reformed Proposal <p>The central claim of a Consummation Anyway (CA) model is that God could bring about eschatological consummation sans the fall—the intended telos of created humanity—apart from the incarnation of Christ. As such, the CA model is an alternative to an Incarnation Anyway (IA) model, according to which Christ’s incarnation is a necessary means by which a state of eschatological glory would be achieved sans the fall. This essay seeks to propose an argument for the CA model by drawing from the covenant theology of the Reformed tradition, and it moves in four steps. Firstly, I shall summarize Marc Cortez’s recent arguments for IA, homing in on the major moves that are most relevant for sketching a CA model. Secondly, I will highlight the challenges Cortez has offered against those interested in defending a CA model. Thirdly, I shall sketch a Reformed account of the CA model that seeks to address Cortez’s objections. Fourthly, then, I’ll consider two potential objections against the sketch I have offered for CA, inspired by a recent argument offered by James T. Turner (2019). Finally, I close with a brief conclusion that summarizes some salient features of the proposed thesis. This paper thus proposes at least one way in which the CA thesis could remain a real and live option within this debate.</p> N. Gray Sutanto Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 223 237 10.12978/jat.2021-9.1300-65182014 He Died for Our Sins (in a Contextually-Sensitive Way) <p>How does Jesus’s death atone for human sin? Traditional answers to this question face a challenge: explain how Jesus’s death plays an important and distinctive role in atoning for human sin without employing problematic philosophical or moral assumptions. I present a new answer that meets the challenge. In the context of the Jewish sacrificial background, the blood of a pure victim can communicate the washing away of sins. Jesus’s death atones because through it his blood, and then his resurrection, can communicate the washing away of sins and thus that God has accepted his work of atonement.</p> Joshua C. Thurow Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 238 261 10.12978/jat.2021-9.0914-65190722 Antiunitarian Arguments from Divine Perfection <p>Some have argued that unipersonal concepts of God collapse into incoherence, so that such a being is no more possible than a square circle, or at least that such theologies are, as non-trinitarian, significantly less probable than some trinitarian theologies. I discuss the general strategy and examine recent arguments by William Lane Craig, C. Stephen Layman, Thomas V. Morris, and Richard Swinburne based on divine love, flourishing, and glory. I show why none of these arguments is compelling, as each has at least one weak premise.</p> Dale Tuggy Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 262 290 10.12978/jat.2021-9.030004-6519-65 Does St. Paul Believe in Original Sin? Yeah, but so What? <p>In this article, I discuss the extent to which St. Paul’s view of the doctrine of Original Sin ought to be taken as authoritative for confessing Christians today. I begin with the observation that there are, in the main, two camps represented in the contemporary literature. On the one hand, there are those who affirm the presence of Original Sin in Rom. 5, and consequently embrace the doctrine; on the other hand, there are those who deny Original Sin any substantive anchor in the text, and as a result conclude it is not necessary to believe today. I argue that things are not so straightforward, and present what I take to be a legitimate <em>via media</em> between these two positions. In the first main section of the article, I argue on exegetical grounds that Rom. 5:12–21 can be rendered adequately intelligible only when we admit that something like the Augustinian view of Original Sin is present at least <em>in nuce</em>. This I attempt to demonstrate in conversation with Douglas Moo and C. E. B. Cranfield (plus a bonus thought from Luther). While not, of course, the full-blown Augustinian doctrine, St. Paul's mind is, I contend, much nearer to the former’s view of Original Sin than is commonly supposed. However, in the second main section I turn my attention to the question, So what? I discuss a number of theological and exegetical considerations which make it clear, I think, that St. Paul is not <em>urging belief</em> in Original Sin so much as he is utilizing an “intertestamental expansion” of an OT text to paint a picture about Christ and what we ought to believe about <em>him</em>. As such, I encourage and defend the application of a relatively mild hermeneutical principle which will allow the theologian a clear and biblically faithful way around the doctrine of Original Sin, if this is what is desired.</p> Daniel Spencer Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-27 2021-09-27 9 291 313 10.12978/jat.2021-9.030011181517 Christ and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities <p>Classical Christology provides reason to reject the principle of alternative possibilities [PAP]. The Gethsemane prayer highlights an instance in which Jesus Christ performs a voluntary and morally significant action which he could not have done otherwise, namely, Christ’s submission to God’s will. Two classical Christological doctrines undermine PAP: (1) impeccability, and (2) volitional non-contrariety. Classical Christology teaches that Christ could not sin, and that Christ’s human will could not be contrary to his divine will. Yet, classical Christology also teaches that Christ’s death is voluntary and morally praiseworthy. First, I present the relevant elements of classical Christology: dyothelitism, impeccability, and volitional non-contrariety. Second, I define and disambiguate varieties of PAP. Third, I show that Christ’s prayer in Gethsemane disproves PAP. I respond to several objections along the way. Finally, I reflect on the implications of denying PAP.</p> Randall Kenneth Johnson Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-11-01 2021-11-01 9 314 321 10.12978/jat.2021-9.170007091413 Nowhere Men and Divine I’s: Feminist Epistemology, Perfect Being Theism, and the God’s-Eye View <p>This paper employs tools and critiques from analytic feminist scholarship in order to show how particular values commonly on display in analytic theology have served both to marginalize certain voices from the realm of analytic theological debate and to reinforce a particular conception of the divine—one which, despite its historical roots, is not inevitable. I claim that a particular conception of what constitutes a “rational, objective, analytic thinker” often displays certain affinities with those infinite or maximal properties that analytic theologians have taken to be most relevant or essential to their theological conceptions of the divine, and I explore what thinking differently about the former might mean for how we think about the latter and vice versa.</p> Amber Griffioen Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 1 25 10.12978/jat.2021-9.001217061713 There’s Something about Mary: Challenges and Prospects for Narrative Theodicy <p>This paper explores the constraints of narrative theodicy to account for the misery of the powerless and uses Mary of Bethany as a case study as evaluated through the early modern theodical writings of Mary Astell and Mary Hays. Eleonore Stump has pointed out that Mary of Bethany’s misery is interesting because it is so personal; it results from losing her heart’s desire. But, Mary of Bethany’s case fails as narrative theodicy because it cannot (unlike other cases, such as Job) sufficiently demonstrate the power of God in situated expressions of suffering, speak to plight of the powerless, nor put the sufferer in a stronger epistemic position. Astell and Hays provide a solution for the problem of lived experiences of systemic oppression for the project of narrative theodicy (it must be for and about suffering), and in so doing, remind us of the continued significance of their work to the philosophical canon. To succeed, narratives used for theodicy must speak directly to the plight of those who suffer, and must allow the powerless, miserable, unprivileged, and oppressed to have access to religious knowledge of the relationship between God and the one in misery, the one powerless.</p> Jill Graper Hernandez Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 26 44 10.12978/jat.2021-9.090811070425 Has God Indeed Said? Skeptical Theism and Scriptural Hermeneutics <p>This paper demonstrates that the skeptical theist’s response to the problem of evil deprives the analytic theologian of theoretical resources necessary to avoid accepting as veridical merely apparent divine commands that endorse cruelty. In particular, I argue that the same skeptical considerations that lead analytic theologians to endorse skeptical theism also lead to what I call “divine command skepticism”—an inability to make certain kinds of judgements about what a good God would or would not command. The danger of divine command skepticism is not that it generates new reasons to think that God has commanded horrors, but, rather, that it undercuts the defeaters we might otherwise have for thinking that God has commanded those horrors. It does so both by rendering illicit certain theological and hermeneutical methodologies employed within liberatory frameworks (i.e., various kinds of liberation theologies) and by depriving the theologian of some of the more “traditional” mechanisms for resolving such apparent conflicts.</p> Michelle Panchuk Copyright (c) 2021 Journal of Analytic Theology 2021-09-22 2021-09-22 9 45 66 10.12978/jat.2021-9.120804150010