Purgatory, Hypertime, and Temporal Experience

Abstract

Recently, JT Turner has argued that proponents of temporally-extended models of purgatory (henceforth, temps) are committed to denying the doctrine of the parousia. Such persons typically argue that temporally-extended models of purgatory are needed to prevent the possibility that a morally imperfect human might become morally perfect too abruptly. In this article, I argue that Turner is mistaken and that by invoking hypertime and a clarification of the sort of abruptness at issue, temps can affirm both purgatory and the doctrine of the parousia.

After clarifying the nature of hypertime, I then present a non-temporal model of purgatory. This model permits those uncomfortable with endorsing the metaphysical possibility of hypertime to nevertheless affirm the key intuition motivating temporally-extended models (i.e. that they are necessary to avoid too abrupt a change in character) without rejecting the doctrine of the parousia.