Grace and Free Will: Quiescence and Control

Abstract

Stump and Timpe have recently proposed Thomistic based solutions to the traditional problem in Christian theology of how to relate grace and free will.  By taking a closer look at the notion of control, I subject Timpe’s account – itself an extension of Stump’s account – to extended critique.  I argue that the centrepiece of Timpe’s solution, his reliance on Dowe’s notion of quasi-causation, is misguided and irrelevant to the problem.  As a result, Timpe’s account fails to avoid Semi-Pelagianism.  I canvass two alternatives, each of which adheres to the broad theological assumptions made by Stump and Timpe, including the positing of only one “unique” grace.  I conclude that each of these proposals fails, although I argue that one comes as close as it is possible to get to a solution given the assumptions made.